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I. INTRODUCTION 
While equal and unobstructed access to the civil court system has 
been a hallmark of American jurisprudence, the increasing influence of 
big business in redefining justice has led to the slow erosion of this 
important Western tradition. Nowhere has this trend been more 
prevalent than in the rapid explosion of arbitration clauses in 
employment and consumer contracts. Crucial U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions have lent a hand in shielding these clauses from attack, and 
according to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “predictably resulted in the 
deprivation of consumers’ rights to seek redress for losses . . . [while 
insulating] powerful economic interests from liability for violations of 
consumer-protection laws.”1 
To be sure, arbitration is a legal procedure with a great deal of 
beneficial, practical use.  When used justly by informed parties with 
equal bargaining power, it is a mechanism of great use.  For instance, 
proponents of arbitration often point to the frequent delays and 
extremely lengthy procedure that are characteristic of already-burdened 
civil litigation and cite arbitration’s expedited claim resolution process 
as proof of its worth.
2
  In certain cases, arbitration can also be cheaper 
than conventional litigation, allowing “companies to pass on to their 
customers, in whole or in part, the lower dispute resolution costs they 
incur as a result of arbitration.”3  Moreover, those advocating 
arbitration also cite “simpler procedural and evidentiary rules,” and its 
capacity to “[minimize] hostility and [be] less disruptive of ongoing . . . 
 
 1. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 193 L. Ed. 2d 365, 381 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
 2. Contracts Against Public Policy: Hearing on A.B. 465 Before the S. Comm. on 
Labor and Indus. Rel. (2015) (“[D]ata from the U.S. District Court Judicial Caseload 
Profiler . . . shows that there were 29,312 civil cases filed in California in 2014. As of June 
2014, approximately 2,132 cases had been pending in federal court in California for over 
three years and the median time from filing of a civil complaint to trial in Northern 
California was 31 months. Comparatively . . . a 2003 article in the New York University 
School of Law legal journal regarding employment arbitration found that arbitration was 
resolved within a year while litigation usually lasted over two years.”).  
 3. Brief of American Bankers Association, American Financial Services Association, 
Consumer Bankers Association, Financial Services Roundtable and California Bankers 
Association in Support of Petitioner as Amici Curiae at 14 citing Stephen J. Ware, Paying 
the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. 
Disp. Resol. 89, 91–93, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
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dealings among the parties.”4 
Its advantages notwithstanding, the flavor of justice that the 
modern arbitration system has created remains increasingly dangerous.  
Binding arbitration decisions, though legally enforceable, usually do 
not provide for a judicial appeals process,
5
 and existing law permits 
arbitrators to disregard the law and/or the evidence in rendering their 
decisions
6
 “without allowing for discovery, complying with the rules of 
evidence, or explaining their decisions in written opinions.”7  The 
arbitration framework is also largely unregulated, costly, and 
“unreceptive to consumers”; employers often select the private 
arbitration company who, in turn, chooses the arbitrators that are made 
available for the parties to select from.
8
  This has created a “repeat 
player advantage,” disadvantaging individual plaintiffs who are one-
time participants in the arbitration system.
9
  The federal government, to 
some extent, has recently acknowledged some of these ill-effects of 
compelled arbitration by moving to ban such clauses in nursing home 
contracts—contracts affecting a particularly vulnerable population.10 
With these traits, it is hardly surprising that businesses are able to 
exploit the process in their favor, leading to dispute resolution in 
friendly confines and, ultimately, a perceived “privatization of the 
justice system.”11  Encouraged by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
 4. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 97–542, at 13 (1982)).  
 5. Hearing on A.B. 465, supra note 2 (citing Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, 
Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (2008)).  
 6. Id. (citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1 (1992)).  
 7. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 1283.1, 1282.2, 1283.4.); see also Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. 
Times (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-
justice-system.html (“Winners and losers are decided by a single arbitrator who is largely at 
liberty to determine how much evidence a plaintiff can present and how much the defense 
can withhold.  To deliver favorable outcomes to companies, some arbitrators have twisted or 
outright disregarded the law, interviews and records show.”).  
 8. Hearing on A.B. 465, supra note 2. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Rebecca Hersher, New Rule Preserves Patients’ Rights To Sue Nursing Homes In 
Court, NPR (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/09/29/495918132/new-rule-preserves-patients-rights-to-sue-nursing-homes-in-
court.  
 11. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the 
Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-
justice-system.html (“Arbitration records obtained by The Times showed that 41 arbitrators 
each handled 10 or more cases for one company between 2010 and 2014”) (“[M]ore than 
three dozen arbitrators described how they felt beholden to companies. Beneath every 
decision, the arbitrators said, was the threat of losing business.”) (“Unfettered by strict 
judicial rules against conflicts of interest, companies can steer cases to friendly arbitrators. 
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AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
12
 the problem of this reallocation of 
adjudicatory authority to the private sphere has been compounded by 
dramatic increases in the use of arbitration clauses to preclude plaintiffs 
from resorting to class action litigation, with workers and consumers 
bearing the brunt of this trend.
13
  A recent New York Times exposé has 
elaborated on the true scope of this relatively recent development.  
Federal class actions in which defendants filed a motion to compel 
arbitration have increased from just below 100 in 2005 to well over 250 
in 2014, with a grand total of over 1,700 such actions filed during that 
time period.
14
  Out of those, the number of cases in which judges 
actually ordered plaintiffs to arbitration correspondingly increased as 
well, from around 50 in 2005, to nearly 140 in 2014.
15
  The Wall Street 
Journal also recently reported that “companies using arbitration clauses 
to preclude class-action claims soared to 43% [in 2014] from 16% in 
2012.”16 
The problem seems to be most acute within the labor sector, as 
employment cases dominate the arbitration scene—there were 149 
cases involving labor disputes from 2005 to 2009, and 470 from 2010 
to 2014, an increase of 215%.
17
  Consumer contract and banking cases 
followed labor disputes in arbitration relevance, with nearly 320 and 
230 cases filed between 2005 and 2014, respectively.
18
  With regards to 
workers, the fact remains that low-wage employees have very few 
remedies to resort to when their rights are violated, and language 
barriers that are particularly profound in such jobs prevent informed 
agreements.
19
  Workers and consumers both are left with a system for 
administering justice which allows financial behemoths like Wells 
 
In turn, interviews and records show, some arbitrators cultivate close ties with companies to 
get business.”).  
 12. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
 13. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking 
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-
the-deck-of-justice.html (“By inserting individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number 
of consumer and employment contracts, companies like American Express devised a way to 
circumvent the courts and bar people from joining together in class-action lawsuits, 
realistically the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices.”).  
 14. Robert Gebeloff & Karl Russell, Removing the Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2015),  
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/30/business/dealbook/arbitration-trends.html.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Lauren Weber, More Companies Block Employees From Filing Suits, Wall St. J. 
(Mar. 31, 2015, 1:51PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-block-staff-from-
suing-1427824287.  
 17. Gebeloff & Russell, supra note 14. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Hearing on A.B. 465, supra note 2.  
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Fargo, recently fined $185 million by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) for defrauding consumers, to defend 
themselves by widespread manipulation of class-action waiver 
clauses.
20
 
This Comment will explore some of the solutions and avenues for 
relief that the state of California is poised to offer its workers and 
consumers—a state that has in recent years vigorously fought to test 
the limits of federal pro-arbitration policy.  It will begin by laying out 
the foundation of this policy in Part II, discussing the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act through decisions like 
Concepcion.  Part II will also explore California’s response to this 
trend by way of PAGA qui tam actions, along with other legislative 
and executive attempts to address the proliferation of arbitration. Part 
III will showcase how existing attempts to resolve this issue leave 
much to be desired.  Finally, in Part IV, this Comment investigates how 
one sector of businesses, benefit corporations and B Corps, can take 
leadership and build the momentum necessary for returning meaningful 
court access to plaintiffs litigating against corporations in the face of 
forced arbitration. 
II. BACKGROUND AND ARBITRATION FOUNDATIONS 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
The Supreme Court’s interaction with the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) since the Act’s inception in 1925 has led to the precarious 
situation consumers and employees find themselves in today.  Thus, to 
understand the omnipresent nature of arbitration arrangements within 
the modern legal framework, along with California’s solutions to their 
proliferation, it is important to begin with the FAA. 
The circumstances and political climate surrounding the Act’s 
adoption in 1925 were of a far different nature than that which is 
present today.  The legislation was originally enacted largely in 
response to judicial enmity towards agreements that included 
arbitration, a hostility that had roots in the colonial era.
21
  The 
 
 20. Emily Peck, The Infuriating Reason Wells Fargo Got Away With Its Massive Scam 
For So Long, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 22, 2016, 4:55PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/wells-fargo-fraud-
republicans_us_57e4192be4b0e80b1ba0d583.  
 21. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); see also Jodi 
Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012) (“The FAA was conceived as a remedy for judicial 
hostility toward arbitration agreements. This judicial hostility dated back to colonial times. It 
was prevalent in both state and federal courts—reaching even the United States Supreme 
Court[.]”). 
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“revocability doctrine” was the norm before the FAA, where any party 
to an arbitration agreement could object to arbitration and revoke its 
agreement to arbitrate.
22
  Soon, the business community began to grow 
frustrated with courts honoring the revocability of agreed-upon 
arbitration and lobbied for change.
23
  The “revocability doctrine” was 
eventually overruled, first with the New York Arbitration Act of 1920, 
and then the FAA.
24
 
The most important provision of the FAA, considering the 
substantial attention it has garnered in Supreme Court opinions 
interpreting it, is Section 2, referred to as the “primary substantive 
provision”:25 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, 
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.
26
 
In other words, any agreement to arbitrate involving commerce is 
held “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” yet such agreements may be 
invalidated for any reason that is applicable to contracts in general.
27
  
This provision of the FAA, particularly the final clause discussing 
grounds in which agreements to arbitrate may not be enforceable, has 
been subject to close judicial parsing. 
Notably, Congress may have never intended the FAA to apply to 
employment contracts whatsoever.  As one legal professor has stated 
“[t]he statute was passed to address the problem of discrimination 
against bargained-for arbitration agreements between merchants having 
roughly equal bargaining power.”28  Employment contracts of adhesion 
seem to lie, according to this description and taking into account 
 
 22. Wilson, supra note 21, at 98–99.  
 23. Id at 99. 
 24. Id. at 99-100.  
 25. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(describing the section as a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary.”). 
 26. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (LexisNexis 2015); see also Wilson, supra note 21, at 100 (“With this 
provision, Congress intended to ensure that arbitration agreements occupied ‘the same 
footing as other contracts.’”). 
 27. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 28. See Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative 
Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1205 (2013).  
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Congressional testimony of the time, entirely outside the original scope 
of the FAA.
29
  The underlying issue this exposes is that the FAA’s 
language “is arguably broader than the intent behind the statute as 
expressed during the Congressional hearings” and this discrepancy has 
led to Court expansion of FAA scope.
30
 
Initial applications notwithstanding, while the unique and lowly 
legal status of arbitration agreements in the early 20
th
 century was the 
primary catalyst for the FAA’s adoption, judicial interpretation of the 
law has not only reinstated the enforceability of arbitration, but has 
gone a step further to pave the way for a broader federal policy 
favoring arbitration.
31
  This is demonstrated below. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Expansion of the FAA: A Federal Policy of 
Arbitration Favoritism 
It was not until several decades after the FAA’s inception that this 
policy began to substantively form.  The first step was the Court 
holding that arbitration clauses in contracts were indeed separable and 
could be assessed independently from the contract at-large.
32
  This 
indicated a shift elevating arbitration agreements’ legal status since 
they were no longer on the “same footing as other contracts.”33  The 
Court then resolved any doubts regarding the newly elevated status of 
arbitration when it later declared that Section 2 of the FAA represented 
“a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary.”34 
 
 29. See Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (“It is the primary end of this 
contract that it is a contract between merchants one with another, buying and selling 
goods”).  A careful reading of section 1 of the FAA might lead one to conclude that the law 
does not even apply to employment contract.  But see Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 
U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that the exemption clause in Section 1 of the FAA only 
exempted employment contracts of transportation workers, and not all workers). 
 30. Imre S. Szalai, Aggregate Dispute Resolution: Class and Labor Arbitration, 13 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 399, 439-40 (2008).  
 31. Wilson, supra note 21, at 101–02, (discussing how judicial wariness towards 
arbitration did not immediately give way in the aftermath of the FAA’s adoption).  
 32. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967). 
 33. Id. at 403–04 (allowing courts to enforce clauses compelling arbitration regardless 
of the validity of the rest of the contract it was embedded in); see also id. at 423 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he separability rule which the Court applies to an arbitration clause does not 
result in equality between it and other clauses in the contract.”) (also stating that the 
question surrounding the making of an arbitration agreement should be determined with 
reference to state and not federal law “formulated by judges for the purpose of promoting 
arbitration”). 
 34. Moses, supra note 25, at 24-25 (justifying this new pronouncement by looking to 
the fact that lower courts had been reaching this conclusion since Prima Paint, and stating 
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
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Very soon after Moses, the Court pivoted to the application of 
FAA doctrine to conflicts with state law in Southland Corp. v. 
Keating,
35
 a decision that typified the perennial conflict between 
California courts and the Supreme Court on matters of arbitration.  
There, the Court’s majority stated that the FAA was not only applicable 
to state courts, but it also preempted conflicting state substantive law.
36
  
Whether or not this new view of arbitration meshed well with 
precedent was something Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was rather 
alarmed with, believing that the majority was engaging in “judicial 
revisionism.”37  Revisionism or not, Southland merely represents one in 
a line of Supreme Court decisions addressing conflicts between 
California law encouraging civil court proceedings and the FAA. 
Class arbitration is another aspect of the FAA’s application that 
has had increasing relevance in employment contracts.  In Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, a plurality of the Supreme Court vacated a 
state court decision that ordered class arbitration when the arbitration 
contract at issue was arguably silent on the issue.
38
  This, in turn, led to 
lower courts, the American Arbitration Association, and arbitrators 
treating Bazzle as setting forth an unquestioned holding that 
“arbitrators, not courts, must determine whether an arbitration 
agreement provides for class arbitration”39 and that “class actions may 
be arbitrated when the agreement between the parties is silent on the 
question.”40  Thus, the non-binding plurality opinion of Bazzle was 
given too much subsequent weight, resulting in authorities interpreting 
the decision to stand for principles it may have never been intended to 
represent.
41
 
 
arbitration”). 
 35. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  
 36. See id. at 15–16 (preempting California’s Franchise Investment Law, which was 
interpreted by the California Supreme Court as calling for “judicial consideration of claims” 
brought under its authority); see also id. at 10 (stating that, in enacting Section 2 of the 
FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of 
the states to require a judicial forum”). 
 37. Id. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 38. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion) (Justice 
John Paul Stevens issued a separate opinion explaining that the FAA did not preclude a state 
court from determining that the agreements are silent regarding class arbitration and that 
class arbitration is permissible.  However, recognizing that adherence to his preferred 
disposition would result in no controlling judgment, Justice Stevens concurred in the result 
reached by the plurality.). 
 39. Szalai, supra note 30, at 403-04.  
 40. Id 404. (citing Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 262 (Ill. 2006)). 
 41. See id. at 406.  
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C. The Concepcion Decision 
The above cases, each buttressing a strong federal preference 
towards arbitration, eventually led to one of the strongest 
pronouncements of FAA authority in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion.
42
 Prior to the Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that under substantive 
California contract law and the rule announced in the California 
Supreme Court decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
43
 the 
compelled arbitration clause of the contract was unconscionable and 
not preempted by the FAA.
44
 
The California Civil Code permits courts to refuse enforcement of, 
or to limit the application of, any contract found “unconscionable at the 
time it was made.”45  According to Discover Bank, class action waivers 
in consumer contracts of adhesion are unconscionable when the “party 
with the superior bargaining power” is said to have “carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money.”46  In the Ninth Circuit’s review of 
Discover Bank’s application, it found the rule was not preempted by 
the FAA partly because the federal law was silent on traditional class 
actions and class action arbitration,
47
 and also because the rule 
represented a “principle of California law that does not specifically 
apply to arbitration agreements, but to contracts generally.”48   
In Concepcion, however, Supreme Court held that the Discover 
Bank rule was in fact preempted by the FAA.
49
  This decision changed 
 
 42. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336-37 (2011) (citing App. 
To Pet. For Cert. 61a) (involving a California cellular service contract of adhesion between 
the vendor and a customer, which provided for arbitration and explicitly required any claims 
arising out of that contract to be brought in an “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or 
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding”).  
 43. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).  
 44. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338; see also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000) (holding pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements, on 
which employment is conditioned and that encompass unwaivable statutory rights, are valid 
and enforceable as long as the following contractual protections are included: (1) provide for 
a neutral arbitrator; (2) no limitation of remedies; (3) adequate opportunity to conduct 
discovery; (4) written arbitration award and judicial review of the award; and (5) no 
requirement for the employee to pay unreasonable costs that he would not incur in litigation 
or arbitration). 
 45. Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a) (West 2015).  
 46. Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162-63 .  
 47. Id. at 163-65.  
 48. Id. at 165 (noting that the rule did not run afoul of the FAA’s savings clause). 
 49. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343 (“[N]othing in [Section 2’s saving clause] suggests an 
intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
FAA’s objectives.”); see also id. at 348 (stating that requiring the availability of class 
arbitration would profoundly frustrate the purpose of arbitration by sacrificing its useful 
informality, making the process slower, more costly, and more likely to “generate 
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how businesses could avoid class proceedings, since states were now 
helpless when trying to “protect the other party through substantive 
rules of contract law.”50  Class actions have historically been an 
advantageous avenue for employees and consumers to expose 
widespread corporate mismanagement, while aggregating small claims 
to punish large businesses where it hurts them most: their pockets.
51
  
Now, while certain class waivers might be considered legally 
unconscionable in agreements without arbitration clauses, businesses 
can evade plaintiffs’ class litigation by simply including arbitration 
clauses in their agreements.
52
  How this resulting expansion of the FAA 
meshes with the law’s original intent—to eliminate judicial hostility by 
ensuring that arbitration agreements are enforced on equal footing with 
other contracts—is seriously questionable.53 
The cases that followed Concepcion also illustrate the immensely 
influential nature of that decision.  In American Express v. Italian 
Colors, the Supreme Court held that class action waivers contained in 
mandatory arbitration clauses were valid even if plaintiffs could prove 
that it would not be financially feasible to maintain these actions 
individually.
54
  Most recently, the Supreme Court heard another case 
involving a contract construed by California courts to be 
unconscionable due to a clause waiving class-wide arbitration.
55
  There, 
the Court predictably reversed the California decision, holding that 
such a conclusion did not “place arbitration contracts ‘on equal footing 
 
procedural morass” while greatly increasing the risks to defendants in the process).  
 50. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1204.  
 51. See id. at 1207 (“Classwide procedures have provided significant public policy 
benefits in resolving disputes across a broad range of subject areas by making it 
economically feasible to enforce legal rules in small-dollar transactions, thereby providing 
deterrence, compensation, and a supplement to governmental enforcement efforts.”). 
 52. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 123; see also Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. 
Concepcion: From Unconscionability to Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 
2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-
unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights (“[The Concepcion] ruling is the real game-
changer for class action litigation, as it permits most of the companies that touch consumers’ 
day-to-day lives to place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply 
incorporating class waiver language into their standard-form contracts.”). 
 53. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 100–01 (describing the original intent of the FAA). 
 54. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); see also 
Salvatore U. Bonaccorso, State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration Law, 67 STAN L. 
REV. 1145, 1155 (2015) (stating that the ruling in Italian Colors stands for the proposition 
that a “congressional preference for arbitration could frustrate the vindication of a 
competing federal right [the effective vindication rule]”); see also Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he FAA was never meant to produce this outcome . . .  
In the hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to become . . . a mechanism easily 
made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from 
liability.”). 
 55. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 193 L. Ed. 2d 365, 370 (2015).  
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with all other contracts’”56 and thus did not give “due regard . . . to the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.”57  It was now dreadfully clear that 
if California wanted to alter the post-Concepcion arbitration and class-
action landscape to return some semblance of power and leverage to 
those embroiled in litigation against large businesses, it would have to 
resort to other means. 
D. California Strikes Back: The Private Attorney General Act 
Fortunately for workers shackled by employment contracts, 
California courts’ repeated unsuccessful attempts to side with 
employees in the arbitration battle did not result in judges bowing to 
the FAA once and for all.
58
  For example, in Chavarria v. Ralphs 
Grocery Co., the Ninth Circuit found an arbitration clause in an 
employment contract procedurally and substantively unconscionable 
and thus unenforceable.
59
  Invalidating the clause in question on 
conscionability grounds was not preempted by the FAA because 
“California law regarding unconscionable contracts, as applied in this 
case, is not unfavorable towards arbitration, but instead reflects a 
generally applicable policy against abuses of bargaining power.”60  
Navigating between the Court’s decisions in Concepcion and Italian 
Colors to reach this decision was especially tricky for the Ninth 
Circuit.
61
 
 
 56. Id. at 375 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 
(2006)). 
 57. Imburgia, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 375 (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)); see also id. at 374 (The fact that Imburgia 
seemed to directly fly in the face of the Court’s holding just a few years prior in Concepcion 
was not ignored by the Justices at oral argument or in writing the majority opinion.) (“[T]he 
view that state law retains independent force even after it has been authoritatively 
invalidated by this Court is one courts are unlikely to accept.”); see also Ronald Mann, 
Opinion analysis: Justices rebuke California courts (again) for refusal to enforce 
arbitration agreement, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 14, 2015, 2:08 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/opinion-analysis-justices-rebuke-california-courts-
again-for-refusal-to-enforce-arbitration-agreement/ (“Breyer mused at argument that, despite 
his dissent from Concepcion, this case seemed to follow so closely upon it that a contrary 
ruling amounted to little more than evasion of the earlier case.”) (“[R]eader can sense the 
Justices’ bristling sensitivity to the lower court’s casual rejection of the Concepcion 
opinion”). 
 58. In some scenarios after Concepcion, California courts had little choice but to 
accede to FAA preemption; see Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC 61 Cal. 4th 899, 
923–24 (2015)(finding class action waivers enforceable in a consumer automobile sales 
contracts and that the anti-waiver provision of the California Legal Remedies Act is 
preempted as it pertains to an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA.). 
 59. See Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co. 733 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 60. Id. at 927 (also stating that “[f]ederal law favoring arbitration is not a license to tilt 
the arbitration process in favor of the party with more bargaining power”). 
 61. Id. at 926–27.  
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1. The PAGA as a Concepcion Work-Around 
Regardless of Chavarria, it remained incredibly difficult for 
employees to litigate as a class against large businesses when contracts 
called for mandated arbitration.  Eventually, however, one provision of 
California law, the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA),
62
 emerged 
as a promising means for workers to make use of certain elements of 
class action, while evading federal arbitration preemption.  The PAGA, 
an iteration of the traditional qui tam action, authorizes an employee to 
“bring an action for civil penalties on behalf of the state against his or 
her employer for Labor Code violations committed against the 
employee and fellow employees, with most of the proceeds of that 
litigation going to the state.”63 
The PAGA was enacted in response to a number of issues, one of 
which was labor compliance.
64
  To encourage this, the PAGA 
empowered “aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, 
to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations, with the 
understanding that labor law enforcement agencies were to retain 
primacy over private enforcement efforts.”65  In other words, the 
PAGA permits employees to bring civil actions personally and “on 
behalf of” other employees for Labor Code violations.66  For our 
purposes, the most significant aspects of the PAGA are its potential to 
parallel the traditional use of aggregative litigation, while operating in 
a gray area of FAA preemption of state laws that favor class action.  
PAGA claims are similar to class actions in that they also permit 
private individuals “to sue for violations affecting a group of similarly 
situated persons and to recover an amount based on the aggregate harm 
to the group,” but its nuanced differences from traditional class actions 
have allowed PAGA claims to evade FAA preemption thus far.
67
 
Concepcion did not apply to PAGA actions because they were 
representative actions, often brought in counts wholly separate from 
class claims, and as such did not preclude individual actions in addition 
 
 62. Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq. (West 2015). 
 63. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 360 (2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015); see also Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(i) (West 2015) (stating that  
75% of recovered civil penalties go to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, and 
the remaining 25% go towards the aggrieved employees). 
 64. Iskanian, supra note 63, at 379 (stating that in the scenario where civil penalties 
were available there remained “a shortage of government resources to pursue enforcement”). 
 65. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980 (2009). 
 66. Cal. Lab. Code, § 2699(a) (West 2015); see also Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986 
(describing plaintiffs acting essentially as proxies of “state labor law enforcement 
agencies”). 
 67. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1226.  
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to PAGA claims.
68
  Thus, and partly due to this fact, PAGA actions do 
not amount to an “aggregation of individual claims” and do not involve 
private compensation at all—distinct characteristics of the traditional 
class action.
69
  The plaintiff does not “vindicate a private right” but 
rather litigates a claim for the public benefit as a proxy of the state with 
penalties payable to and collectable by the state.
70
  It is through this 
deputization of citizens as private attorneys enforcing the labor code 
that the PAGA avoids falling within the ambit of the FAA.
71
 
Due to the PAGA’s potential to inflict broader liability on 
businesses, it was only natural that they soon incorporated PAGA 
claim waivers in their contracts.  Such waivers raised serious states’ 
rights concerns by “[a]llowing private employers to nullify the 
legislature’s chosen means of enforcing the labor code.”72  Soon 
enough, these PAGA waivers were challenged by aggrieved employees 
in court, and once again, federal preemption loomed large. 
2. The Iskanian and Luxottica Decisions 
The California Supreme Court decision in Iskanian v. CLS 
Transportation
73
 represents key case law on the enforceability of 
contractual PAGA claim waivers.  There, an employee for CLS 
Transportation brought claims in a representative capacity under 
PAGA for Labor Code violations, despite signing an arbitration 
agreement pledging not to assert “class action or representative action 
claims” that may “represent the interests of any other person.”74  The 
California Supreme Court invalidated, on FAA preemption grounds, 
the state rule striking down class action waivers in certain 
circumstances,
75
 a partial victory for business.  However, it also 
 
 68. See id.  
 69. Id. at 1226–28 (also stating that “[a] private plaintiff cannot bring a PAGA suit 
based solely on violations with respect to herself, but must sue to recover penalties for 
violations against the whole group”) (noting that PAGA actions “do not present the issues of 
notice, due process, and commonality that the Supreme Court considered beyond the ken of 
arbitrators [in Concepcion]”). 
 70. Id. at 1228.  
 71. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 501-02 (2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct 1910 (2012).  
 72. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1233.  
 73. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 360 (2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015). 
 74. Id. at 360–61.  
 75. Id. at 364–66 (invalidating the rule announced in Gentry that a trial court must 
invalidate a class action waiver when “a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more 
effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual 
litigation or arbitration, and [whether] the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to 
a less comprehensive enforcement of [labor or employment] laws for the employees alleged 
to be affected by the employer’s violations”). Id. at 364 (quoting Gentry v. Superior Court, 
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concluded that waiver of representative claims under the PAGA is 
“contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.”76 
More importantly though, these waivers were not deemed 
preempted by the Court’s decision in Concepcion and/or the FAA.77  
The Court believed that the FAA’s focus on private disputes and not 
those between an employer and a state agency allowed the PAGA to 
escape falling within the realm of the FAA.
78
  Also echoing Professor 
Alexander’s federalism concerns, the Court expressed the belief that, in 
its view, the FAA was not intended “to curtail the ability of states to 
supplement their enforcement capability by authorizing willing 
employees to seek civil penalties for Labor Code violations 
traditionally prosecuted by the state.”79  It was clear that Iskanian 
represented movement in the right direction for defining the outer 
limits of FAA reach. 
It did not take very long for the rule announced in Iskanian to be 
challenged up to the Ninth Circuit in Sakkab v. Luxottica,
80
 the most 
recent and clearest indication of the unenforceability of representative 
PAGA claim waivers.  Like the California Supreme Court before it, 
here too the Ninth Circuit was confronted with questions of FAA 
preemption and it ultimately reached the same conclusion the court 
reached in Iskanian: pre-dispute agreements to waive PAGA claims are 
invalid, and preventing their enforcement is not preempted by the 
FAA’s preference for arbitration.81 
To reach this decision upholding the Iskanian rule, the Ninth 
Circuit looked primarily to two elements of the FAA: the saving clause 
in Section 2 of the FAA,
82
 and the rule’s compatibility with the FAA’s 
purposes.
83
  The Act’s saving clause states that the Iskanian rule must 
be a “[ground] . . . for the revocation of any contract” if it is to preclude 
the default irrevocable nature of arbitration clauses.
84
  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the rule was generally applicable to all contracts 
because it barred waiver of PAGA claims without regard to their 
presence in an arbitration or non-arbitration contract.
85
 
 
42 Cal. 4th 443, 463 (2007)). 
 76. Id. at 383-84.  
 77. Id. at 387–89.  
 78. Id. at 384-85; see also Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 387 (“The fact that any judgment in 
a PAGA action is binding on the government confirms that the state is the real party in 
interest.”). 
 79. Id. at 388.  
 80. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 81. See id. at 427.  
 82. Id. at 432; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 83. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 433. 
 84. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  
 85. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 432. 
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Yet, following the logic in Concepcion, a generally applicable 
contract defense like the Iskanian rule might still be preempted if it 
conflicts with the purposes of the FAA.
86
  One such purpose, as 
described above, is to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration.
87
  The 
Luxottica court believed that the Iskanian rule did not frustrate this 
purpose because the rule does not express a preference for whether 
PAGA claims are litigated or arbitrated.
88
  Another purpose of the 
FAA, to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to 
their terms,
89
 was also not contravened since the rule did not “diminish 
parties’ freedom to select informal arbitration procedures.”90  Because 
PAGA actions do not vindicate absent employees’ claims, do not 
require special procedures, and are merely actions for penalties brought 
by employees as proxies of the state, parties are still free “to select the 
arbitration procedures that best suit their needs.”91 
PAGA claims seemed to have weathered the FAA preemption 
storm for now,
92
 and this could serve to embolden their use in 
California, as well as legitimize qui tam actions as a Concepcion work-
around in other states.  We have already seen the impact of the 
Iskanian and Luxottica decisions in other, highly publicized, pending 
litigation.  Shortly after the Luxottica decision was handed down, 
attorneys for both parties in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies,93 
involving the certification of a colossal class of nearly 160,000 current 
and former Uber drivers, were asked to weigh in on the relevance of 
the Luxottica decision to the class certification in their own case.
94
  
After their briefing, the District Court Judge issued an order stating 
that, given precedent in Iskanian and Luxottica, Uber’s blanket PAGA 
waiver in its contract was not only unenforceable, but also 
unseverable.
95
  As such, the whole arbitration agreement was also 
 
 86. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011). 
 87. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 434.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (2011) (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
 90. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 435-36.  
 91. Id. at 436-37; see also id. at 439-40 (stating that while qui tam actions might be 
difficult to arbitrate, that does “not mean that the FAA requires courts to enforce private 
agreements opting out of the state’s chosen method of enforcing its labor laws”). 
 92. Daniel Wiessner, Business groups urge 9th Circuit to rethink ruling on PAGA 
waivers, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/employment-
waivers-idUSL1N13K2IG20151125. 
 93. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 94. Daniel Wiessner, Judge urged to reconsider Uber driver class after 9th Circuit 
ruling, REUTERS, (Nov. 12, 2015, 6:41 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/employment-
uber-idUSL1N1370Q220151112.  
 95. O’Connor, 311 F.R.D. at 550-551, 555-556 (order granting in part and denying in 
part plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for class certification).  
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unenforceable.
96
  The effect of this conclusion was the certification of 
an entire subclass, a move sure to impact the litigation going forward.
97
 
E.  PAGA Shortcomings: A Formidable Counter to Concepcion That 
Does Not Go Far Enough 
Luxottica is undoubtedly an important and guiding decision for 
legislators and other states trying to fill the deterrence gap created by 
Concepcion.  With elements of traditional class action, employees are 
now better equipped to make use of some semblance of aggregate 
litigation in order to hold businesses accountable.  However, even if 
qui tam procedures like those authorized by the PAGA continue to be 
used in California and take root nationally, there remains a substantial 
chunk of legal remedies that are still foreclosed to employees and 
consumers in the wake of Concepcion. 
For one, make no mistake that PAGA claims, while similar, are 
not traditional class actions, and thus lack many valuable aspects of 
conventional Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23
98
 suits, such as 
their rigorous procedural safeguards and applicability to a wider range 
of legal liability that falls outside of the PAGA’s strict labor code 
jurisdiction.
99
  Additionally, because PAGA actions do not aggregate 
individual claims, the amount of potential damages are arguably not as 
substantial as that found with regular class actions,
100
 and parties could 
still be subject to arbitration on claims not authorized by the PAGA.
101
 
The fact of the matter is that the underlying legal problem 
remains: businesses employing pre-dispute contracts with arbitration 
clauses to prevent meaningful access to courts by plaintiffs, whether by 
precluding class litigation or forcing arbitration procedures, are 
essentially free to continue doing so.  Absent any meaningful 
leadership or market forces driving out the use of these contract 
clauses, corporations are not compelled to change the status quo.  At 
best, the PAGA only nibbles at FAA and Concepcion preemption 
framework, and only in the realm of class action.  It still does not touch 
private, individualized grievances that an employee-plaintiff wants to 
litigate in court but cannot. 
 
 96. Id. at 555-556.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. (West 2015).  
 99. See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 435-436 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(discussing the procedural differences between FRCP Rule 23 and the PAGA).  
 100. Id. at 437.  
 101. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a) (West 2015) (describing PAGA’s applicability to Labor 
Code violations).  
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III. ALTERNATIVE ATTEMPTS TO REIN IN CONCEPCION: 
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ATTEMPTS 
This is not to say there have not been alternative, more 
comprehensive attempts to restore court access to plaintiffs while 
skirting Supreme Court precedent.  In California itself, the legislature 
has tried to pass several bills trying to rein in the proliferation of unfair 
arbitration clauses.  In 2011, Senator Noreen Evans introduced Senate 
Bill 491, which aimed at rendering void terms of adhesion contracts 
that waived the “right to join or consolidate claims or to bring a claim 
as a representative . . . in a private attorney general capacity.”102  This 
bill was soundly defeated in committee.
103
 
More recently, in February 2015, Assemblyman Roger Hernandez 
introduced Assembly Bill 465, a far more comprehensive proposal than 
S.B. 491.  This new bill set out the principle that any waivers of legal 
rights should be “knowing and voluntary and in writing, and expressly 
not made as a condition of employment.”104  Among other things, the 
bill also placed the burden of proving “knowing and voluntary” 
waivers on the employer,
105
 made requiring arbitration agreements as a 
condition to employment per se invalid,
106
 and afforded employees who 
were successful in invalidating agreements the right to recover 
attorneys’ fees.107 The bill managed to pass both houses and was 
enrolled before eventually being vetoed by Governor Brown in October 
2015.
108
 In justifying his veto, Governor Brown cited the far-reaching 
nature of the bill, along with the preemptive potential of pending 
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court.
109
 
On a national scale there is a history of federal bills trying to limit 
Concepcion that have reached a similar fate to the legislative attempts 
in California.  In fact, Senator Al Franken announced intentions to re-
introduce the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) on the very day 
Concepcion was handed down.
110
  This legislation would have 
 
 102. S. 491 (2011), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0451-
0500/sb_491_bill_20120430_amended_asm_v97.html. 
 103. Cheryl Miller, Legislation to Blunt “Concepcion” Is Killed in State Assembly, THE 
RECORDER (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202561826154?keywords=Cheryl+Miller&publication=Th
e+Recorder&elementType=Article. 
 104. Contracts Against Public Policy: A.B. 465 § 2(c) (2015).  
 105. Id. at § 2(e).  
 106. Id. at §§ 2(a), 2(d).  
 107. Id. at § 2(g).  
 108. Margot Roosevelt, Gov. Brown vetoes bill that would have protected workers’ right 
to sue employers, OC REGISTER (Oct. 12, 2015, 11:56 PM), 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/brown-687230-arbitration-workers.html.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1209.  
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amended the FAA to invalidate all pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
in consumer, employment, and civil rights actions, essentially 
rendering the FAA inapplicable to such agreements.
111
  In other words, 
the AFA sought to recalibrate the FAA’s scope to fall in line with the 
Act’s original purpose and intention.112  Unfortunately though, the 
AFA failed to gain bi-partisan support and died in committee.
113
 
Stepping away from the legislature, federal agencies, most notably 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), have also 
committed themselves to finding solutions to the problems Concepcion 
introduced.  As authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB is 
permitted to “study the use of pre-dispute arbitration in consumer 
contracts for financial products or services and to submit a report to 
Congress.”114  In March 2015, the Bureau released a three-year, 700 
page study demonstrating the surprising pervasiveness of arbitration 
clauses, how such clauses can act as a barrier to class actions, and the 
exorbitant costs arbitration has imposed on employees and 
consumers.
115
  Soon after that report’s release, in May 2016, the CFPB 
formally published a proposed rule prohibiting “companies from 
putting mandatory arbitration clauses in new contracts that prevent 
class action lawsuits.”116  The proposal also requires “companies with 
arbitration clauses to submit to the CFPB claims, awards, and certain 
related materials that are filed in arbitration cases,” in order to facilitate 
 
 111. Id. at 1209-10.  
 112. Id. at 1210–211.  
 113. Id. at 1211; see also H.R. 2087: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, GOV TRACK (Apr. 
29, 2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2087 (noting a version of the AFA 
that was again reintroduced in April 2015 and at the time this comment was written, is in 
committee); see also Alexander, supra note 28, at 1211–212 (discussing the Fair Arbitration 
Act of 2011, which “would have amended the FAA to require that any arbitration clause 
have a heading printed in bold capital letters, state whether arbitration is mandatory or 
elective, provide a contact for a consumer to inquire about costs, fees, and forms required 
for participation, and state that a consumer or employee may proceed in small claims court 
rather than arbitration”). 
 114. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1215–216 (citing 12 U.S.C.S. § 5518(b)) (stating that 
CFPB has “broad authority to promulgate regulations to ‘prohibit or impose conditions or 
limitations’ on pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts for consumer financial products or 
services ‘if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or 
limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers’”). 
 115. CFPB Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers, 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-
limit-relief-for-consumers/. 
 116. CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of 
Consumers their Day in Court, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (May 5, 2016), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-their-
day-court/.  
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greater transparency in this area.
117
  This proposal has been highly 
divisive and had garnered nearly 13,000 public comments as of August 
2016.
118
 
Regrettably, despite the promising and optimistic outlook of 
CFPB proposals, there remains a good chance the Bureau’s proposals 
will be toothless and in vain.  Firstly, the Bureau’s authority is confined 
to contracts for consumer financial products and do not cover 
employment contracts, a substantial area of law desperately needing 
protection from forced arbitration.
119
  Moreover, there is still “no 
private right of action to enforce violations of CFPB rules,” and any 
Bureau proposal still has a good probability of being struck down by 
the Supreme Court as attempting to reverse Concepcion.
120
 
All of this goes to show that any real hope of empowering 
consumers and employees in the aftermath of Concepcion will likely 
not be dependent on federal or state legislation, mainly due to the 
inability to gain consistent bi-partisan support.  Combine those 
prospects with the use of PAGA and qui tam actions that only go so far 
to chip away at FAA preemption, and we are left desperately needing 
another route to empower those litigating against the boundless 
resources of corporations. 
Such a route should begin and end with these businesses 
themselves, institutions that have thus far been mostly absent and 
unengaged with regards to working out solutions to the problem of 
unfettered arbitration.  Undoubtedly, businesses themselves have 
played a front-and-center role in the development of federal policy 
favoring arbitration, as they have always been unabashedly mobilized 
in favor of private claims resolution.
121
  However, given that the 
potential legislative, executive, and judicial solutions addressed above 
are either doomed to failure or severely deficient, if the problem of 
arbitration is to truly improve, businesses must play a role in their 
demise and take responsibility for the status quo.  Once this is done, 
more workable and viable solutions to this legal dilemma will follow.  
Interestingly, there is one very promising sector of the business 
community that holds a key to ameliorating the crisis of unequal access 
to justice vis-à-vis arbitration. 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Yuka Hayashi, CFPB’s Arbitration Proposal Draws 13,000 Comments, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpbs-arbitration-proposal-draws-13-000-
comments-1471983139.   
 119. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1216.  
 120. Id. at 1216-17 (also discussing the impact of Republican opposition to the CFPB as 
hindering its effectiveness).  
 121. See supra Part II(A). 
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IV. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BUSINESSES TO RETURN 
LITIGANTS’ ACCESS TO COURTS 
Businesses, particularly socially conscious “benefit corporations” 
and related entities, have altogether been much too silent on the 
increasingly relevant issue of forced arbitration.  This has been in spite 
of their alleged commitment to the general public welfare in addition to 
bottom lines.  Sure, businesses have already begun very publicly 
championing commitment to other worthwhile social causes ranging 
from environmental sustainability to fair pay and humane working 
conditions, but the list should not end there.  This Part will explore the 
potential for benefit corporations to provide desperately needed 
business-centered leadership and accountability for consumers’ and 
workers’ deplorable access to courts. 
A. Benefit Corporations and B Corps: Socially Conscious Institutions 
Professor of business administration R. Edward Freeman created 
waves in 1984 when he released his book Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach, outlining the now well-known stakeholder 
approach to business management.
122
  Following in the footsteps of 
Harvard Law Professor E. Merrick Dodd’s seminal article For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees, this methodology focuses on 
managing the multitude of “stakeholders” of a business venture and 
infuses business with a sense of morality and social value.
123
  
According to the stakeholder theory, businesses should not solely focus 
on its shareholders and profit maximization, but should also look to 
incorporate the opinions of, and cater to, the multitude of a venture’s 
stakeholders, which often include the surrounding community.
124
  This 
eye towards managing stakeholders versus shareholders eventually 
contributed to the emergence of the socially conscious “benefit 
corporation,” and it is here where issues of social justice and access to 
courts can take root. 
Considered by some the “most ascendant social enterprise 
innovation today,”125 benefit corporations owe their advent largely to 
the efforts of the founders of B Lab, a non-profit organization created 
 
 122. R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1984. 
 123. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1931).  
 124. R. Edward Freeman, Andrew C. Wicks & Bidhan Parmar, Stakeholder Theory and 
“The Corporate Objective Revisited,” 15 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 364 (2004). 
 125. Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance 
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
170, 171 (2012).  
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in 2006 that sought to “[use] the power of business to solve social or 
environmental problems.”126  This new organization was trying to 
address “[t]he existence of shareholder primacy which makes it 
difficult for corporations to take employee, community, and 
environmental interests into consideration when making decisions.”127  
A year after its founding, B Lab started certifying companies as 
“Certified B Corporations” if they scored appropriately in their “B 
Impact Assessment” (BIA), which evaluates a company’s impact in a 
range of areas like governance, employees, and community.
128
  As B 
Lab began its certification of socially conscious companies, its 
founders also began lobbying a number of states to pass benefit 
corporation legislation incorporating benefit corporation legal structure 
to existing corporate codes, with Maryland being the first state to do so 
in 2010.
129
  California’s own benefit corporation statute was passed in 
2012, and, an astounding thirty-one states have passed benefit 
corporation legislation to date, with laws in seven other states currently 
pending.
130
 
Benefit corporations are attractive to companies for a host of 
reasons.  For one, their structure allows directors and others in 
positions of power more flexibility to take into consideration the 
impact of their decisions on a venture’s multiple stakeholders—not 
merely its shareholders.
131
  This, in turn, might reduce director liability 
in certain circumstances.
132
 The corporation’s fiduciary duties to its 
shareholders
133
 have the potential to, at times, run counter to the views 
of certain important stakeholders.  Achieving benefit corporation status 
might also be an advantage for cutting-edge companies trying to attract 
talent, especially considering the fact that 77% of millennials, who will 
grow to 75% of the workforce by 2025, say their “company’s purpose 
was part of the reason they chose to work there.”134  Investors are also 
 
 126. Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic 
Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 
1011 (2013).  
 127. Id. (citing Introducing the B Corporation, B Revolution Consulting 4 (May 15, 
2012), http://www.brevolutionconsulting.com/assets/BCorp-Intro-pack.pdf.). 
 128. J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit 
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 488–89 (2013); see infra note 138, 139.  
 129. Id. at 489.  
 130. State by State Status of Legislation. BENEFIT CORPORATION – POWERED BY B LAB. 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status. 
 131. See generally Why is Benefit Corp Right For Me? BENEFIT CORPORATION – 
POWERED BY B LAB http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Cal. Corp. Code §309(a); see supra note 123. 
 134. Id. (citing The Deloitte Millennial Survey: January 2014 Executive Summary, 
DELOITTE, http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-
Deloitte/gx-dttl-2014-millennial-survey-report.pdf.).  
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attracted to these corporations given their “increased legal protection, 
accountability and [mission] transparency. . .”135  Mandated annual 
benefit reports, described below, can also streamline investor due 
diligence.
136
 
It is important to note here the distinction between B Corporations 
on one hand, and benefit corporations on the other.  B Corporations are 
existing institutions privately certified by B Lab, while benefit 
corporations are new corporate entities authorized under specific state 
corporate law.
137
  More nuanced differences between these two forms 
of socially responsible entities are highlighted below. 
1. B Corps and B Lab Certification 
In order to become a B Lab certified “B Corporation” or “B Corp” 
companies must: “take a “B Impact Assessment,” pass an assessment 
review, submit required documentation, adopt B Lab’s amendments to 
their articles of incorporation, and pay B Lab a certification fee.”138  
The BIA itself forms the foundation of B Lab’s certification process 
and consists of a number of questions covering sectors that include 
business governance, community impact, environment, and workers.
139
  
Once a B Corp is certified as such, it is subject to randomly selected 
on-site reviews vis-à-vis B Lab’s private regulatory scheme and must 
also go through the process above every two years to maintain 
certification status.
140
  Additionally, there is no special tax treatment for 
B Corps, and certification does not grant stakeholders any private right 
 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Robert Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on 
Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit 
Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 695 (2013).  
 138. Id. at 696; see also How to Become a B Corp, CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp. 
 139. See generally B Lab Demo Account Assessment (Nov. 19, 2015) http://b-
lab.force.com/bcorp/PrintImpactAssessment?id=a03C000000ISIohIAH; see also Dana 
Brakman Reiser, The Sustainable Corporation: Article: Benefit Corporations – A 
Sustainable Form of Organization? 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 601–02 (2011) (“[B 
Lab’s] survey and audit processes are fully documented online and thus appear to fit the 
transparency requirements, and B Lab will be independent of any unrelated potential 
incorporators. B Lab evaluates potential B corporations using the BIA, which looks at issues 
of corporate accountability, employee policy, products’ benefit to consumers, the company’s 
relationship with its community, and its impact on the environment.  The assessment 
contains a total of two-hundred points, and companies must score eighty points to be 
certified and granted access to the B Corp mark.  B Lab also audits twenty percent of those 
companies who qualify for B Corp certification every two years.”). 
 140. Esposito, supra note 136, at 696; see also Performance Requirements, CERTIFIED B 
CORPORATIONS,  http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp; 
see also Reiser, supra note 139 at 601-02.  
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of action against the company for enforcement purposes.
141
 
Given the lack of any truly tangible benefits of B Corp 
certification and absence of enforceability, the certification “offers only 
moral, rather than legal, assurances to non-shareholder constituencies 
and social interests.”142  As such, the most beneficial aspect of B Lab 
certification lies in its branding value and marketing potential.
143
  
Those closely following the development of B Corps believe that this 
branding potential can have real a positive impact for companies by 
attracting directors “committed to a blended mission and investors 
willing to enforce it,” along with providing a “private regulatory 
system to help enforce a blended enterprise’s dual mission.”144 
2. The California Benefit Corporation Framework 
Benefit corporations, unlike their B Corp counterparts, find their 
legal framework in a given state’s corporations code.  California added 
a section covering benefit corporations in its code in 2012 and it states 
that, to become a benefit corporation, the entity must amend its articles 
to contain a statement that the corporation is a benefit corporation.
145
  
Moreover, the corporation must “have the purpose of creating a general 
public benefit”146 and may also identify any number of “specific public 
benefits.”147  The Code defines a “general public benefit” as “a material 
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as 
assessed against a third-party standard.”148  What this “third-party 
standard” entails will be elaborated below.149  While the Code fails to 
define what a “specific public benefit” consists of, it does offer a list of 
examples
150
 and states generally that it is “[t]he accomplishment of 
any . . . particular benefit for society or the environment.”151 
The California Corporations Code also details a number of 
interests a corporation’s directors and committees must consider in 
discharging their duties, which, for our purposes, include “[t]he 
 
 141. Esposito, supra note 137 at 696. 
 142. Reiser, supra note 139 at 641-42.   
 143. Id. at 643.  
 144. Id.   
 145. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 14603(a), 14610(b) (West 2015).  
 146. Cal. Corp. Code §14610(a).  
 147. Cal. Corp. Code §14610(b).  
 148. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(c).  
 149. See infra note 151.  
 150. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(e)(1–7) (e.g., “Promoting economic opportunity for 
individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the ordinary course of business,” 
“[p]roviding low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial 
products or services,” and “[i]ncreasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit 
purpose”). 
 151. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(e)(7).  
246 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57 
employees and workforce of the benefit corporation,” “[t]he interests of 
customers of the benefit corporation as beneficiaries of the general or 
specific public benefit purposes,” and “community and societal 
considerations,” among others.152  Furthermore, like B Lab, California 
also requires benefit corporations to provide shareholders with an 
annual benefit report.
153
  This report includes details about the progress 
the company made regarding its general and specific benefits and also 
an “assessment of the overall social and environmental performance of 
the benefit corporation, prepared in accordance with a [consistently 
applied] third-party standard.”154 
Throughout the relevant statute, references are made to a “third 
party standard” against which benefit assessment and reporting are 
gauged.
155
  The “third party” charged to develop this standard cannot 
have a “material financial relationship with the benefit corporation or 
any of its subsidiaries,” and must have the requisite knowledge “to 
assess overall corporate social and environmental performance” using a 
“multistakeholder approach.”156  The Code highlights the need for 
transparency in the third party’s evaluations, ensuring that information 
regarding the standard is publicly available.
157
 
In practice, the third party standard is very similar to the standard 
set by B Lab for B Corp certification.  B Lab is, in fact, the most 
prevalent third party standard setter for benefit corporations seeking 
third parties to fulfill state statutory requirements like those in the 
California Corporations Code.
158
  Meeting a given statute’s “limited 
transparency and independence requirements” is not considered a 
difficult barrier to clear, and other standard setters and entity 
certification programs besides B Lab may also qualify.
159
 
 
 152. Cal. Corp. Code §14620(b)(1–7).  
 153. Cal. Corp. Code §14630(a) .  
 154. Cal. Corp. Code §14630 (a)(2).  
 155. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(g) (defining the third party standard as “a standard for 
defining, reporting, and assessing overall corporate social and environmental performance”).  
 156. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(g)(2–3).  
 157. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(g)(4).  
 158. Mitch Nass, The Viability of Benefit Corporations: An Argument for Greater 
Transparency and Accountability, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 875, 884 (2014); see also Reiser, 
supra note 139, at 602 (describing the “third party standard-setter role” as “tailor-made for 
B Lab”); but see Benefit Corporations: Hearing on AB 361 Before Assembly Judiciary 
Committee (May 3, 2011) (raising the concern that “B Lab is ‘uniquely positioned’ to take 
advantage of the [statute] . . . and will become the principal certification agency of benefit 
corporations qualified to form under the statute” to which B Lab responded saying that 
“there are many third party standards organizations that meet the statutory criteria for a third 
party standard. Some examples are: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), GreenSeal, 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL), ISO2600, and Green America . . .”).  
 159. Reiser, supra note 139, at 602–-603 (discussing the potential for certifiers of high 
environmental performance to set third party standards, along with corporate governance 
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3. The Benefit Enforcement Proceeding 
The most impactful difference between B Corps and benefit 
corporations lies in their enforcement mechanisms.  As stated above, 
aside from revoking B Corp status for failing to adhere to B Lab 
benchmarks, there is little B Lab is empowered to do to enforce an 
entity’s commitment to meet rigorous standards of social and 
environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.  This is 
not entirely the case for statutorily authorized benefit corporations. 
California’s code contains a provision allowing for a “benefit 
enforcement proceeding,” a right of action which may be used in the 
case a benefit corporation fails to “pursue the general public benefit 
purpose of the benefit corporation or any specific public benefit 
purpose set forth in its articles.”160  It may also be initiated if the entity 
violates a “duty or standard of conduct imposed on a director,” or fails 
to “deliver or post an annual benefit report.”161  The relevant statue also 
states that these proceedings may only be brought either directly by the 
benefit corporation itself, or derivatively, by a shareholder, director, 
persons owning five percent or more of equity interest in the 
corporation’s parent company, or those specified in the articles or by 
laws of the corporation.
162
  Third-party beneficiaries of the benefit 
corporation’s general or specific benefit purposes do not have standing 
to sue.
163
  These proceedings primarily provide for injunctive relief
164
 
and officers of the corporation are not liable for monetary damages for 
the failure to discharge any obligations required of them by the 
California benefit corporation statute
165
 —a court may only award costs 
incurred in connection with the benefit enforcement proceeding, 
including attorneys’ fees.166 
B. The Opportunity Within Existing B Corp and Benefit Corporation 
Framework To Combat Forced Arbitration 
Recent studies estimate that the number of benefit corporations 
nationally is nearing 2,000, with almost 120 in California alone.
167
  
 
advisory firms, and product-focused standard-setters like Cradle to Cradle).  
 160. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(1), 14623.  
 161. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(2–3).  
 162. Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(b).  
 163. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 14622(d), 14623(a).  
 164. Benefit Corporations and Flexible Purpose Corporations in California: New State 
Legislation Permits Socially Responsible Corporate Formations, JUSTICE & DIVERSITY 
CENTER OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
https://www.sfbar.org/forms/jdc/benefit-corp-memo%20.pdf. 
 165. Cal. Corp. Code § 14622(c). 
 166. Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(d).  
 167. Earth Day 2015: Does the Earth Benefit From Benefit Corporations? REUTERS, 
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With regards to B Lab certified B Corps, there are more than 1,200 
nationally.
168
  These counts seem to suggest that these entities are 
slowly but surely beginning to make their mark on the corporate 
landscape.  These companies are also usually bellwethers on social 
issues and business trends—the “demonstration effect” explains that 
“[b]enefit corp[oration]s show investors and entrepreneurs from every 
industry what the future Fortune 500 looks and acts like.”169  Yet, in a 
move that arguably runs counter to their public benefit commitment, 
many benefit corporations also employ compelled arbitration clauses in 
their contracts, even waiving the right for prospective plaintiffs to 
resort to class procedures.  For instance, a quick glance at the very 
highly regarded benefit corporation Patagonia, reveals their own use of 
these clauses and class action waivers.
170
  In the same way benefit 
corporations and B Corps have used their growing power and influence 
to affect positive change in topics from governance transparency to 
sustainability and civic engagement, they should also begin to take a 
leadership role in stemming the rapid explosion of forced arbitration 
and class action waivers. 
1. Within B Corp Certification 
There are several ways in which socially conscious entities like B 
Corps and statutorily rooted benefit corporations can pivot towards 
addressing employees’ and consumers’ diminished access to courts—
all without the added trouble of trying to amend existing law.  This can 
most easily be done with regards to B Lab’s B Corp certification 
process—specifically, by way of the mandated B Impact Assessment 
reports.
171
  These reports should be updated to assess a given 
company’s use of contract terms like those compelling one-sided 
 
(Apr, 14, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSnMKWmB98da+1d0+MKW20150414; Ellen Berrey, 
How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO, SUNY (May 5, 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602781 (numbers do not include several states that have 
very recently passed benefit corporation legislation, and many states that have previously 
done so do not track benefit corporation creation). 
 168. Our 2016 Year in Review—and #2000BCorps! B LAB (January 5, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@bthechange/our-2016-year-in-review-and-2000bcorps-
3f2acc03d1ff#.xr76nkrxa. 
 169. Why is Benefit Corp Right for Me? BENEFIT CORPORATION, 
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp.  
 170. Terms of Use (July 8, 2014), PATAGONIA, 
http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go?assetid=104582 (“Any dispute relating in any 
way to your visit to Patagonia or to products you purchase through Patagonia shall be 
submitted to confidential arbitration.”) (“[N]o arbitration under this Agreement shall be 
joined to an arbitration involving any other party subject to this Agreement, whether through 
class arbitration proceedings or otherwise.”). 
 171.  See supra Part IV(A).  
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arbitration with grossly unfair terms and forbidding aggregated action.  
Companies trying to become B Lab certified but using these legal 
maneuvers to evade civil litigation should be docked a sufficient 
number of points on their final assessment reports by B Lab. 
Every two years, B Lab updates and improves its already-
thorough BIA report in conjunction with assessment users, 
stakeholders, and B Lab’s Standards Advisory Council.172  This is done 
to “incorporate user feedback, improve clarity and content, and stay up 
to date with market practices and social and environmental issues.”173  
The most recent edition of the assessment, Version 5.0, was released in 
January 2016; Version 6.0 will be released in 2018 and will “involve a 
more comprehensive methodological review of the BIA and its 
scoring.”174  The assessment revision cycle begins after a given version 
is rolled out, with B Lab collecting feedback on areas and ways that 
edition can be improved.
175
  B Lab uses this information to create a 
revised draft of the BIA “for initial review and testing”176 and includes 
reviews by the Standards Advisory Council.
177
  Thereafter, a private 
beta testing of the new assessment begins, followed by a public 
comment period.
178
 
Since Version 6.0 will involve a more thorough review of the 
assessment and scoring weights, this presents a wonderful opportunity 
for the inclusion of questions in the assessment that probe into an 
 
 172. Version 5 of the B Impact Assessment coming January 2016, THE BLOG – 
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/version-
5-of-the-b-impact-assessment-coming-january-2016.  
 173. Public Comment Period for Draft B Impact Assessment Version 5.0, THE BLOG – 
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/public-
comment-period-draft-b-impact-assessment-version-50.  
 174. Version 5 of the B Impact Assessment coming January 2016, THE BLOG – 
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/version-5-of-the-b-impact-assessment-coming-january-
2016.  
 175. Id. (stating that between Version 4.0 in January 2014 and Version 5.0 in January 
2016, over 3,000 individual pieces of feedback for updates was provided). 
 176. Id.  
 177. Standards Advisory Council, CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/standards-
advisory-council (The Standards Advisory Council is “an independent committee of 20–22 
members, each respected in the field for their wisdom and with deep industry or stakeholder 
expertise.  The Standards Advisory Council is divided into two subgroups—one to oversee 
the content and weightings for the version of the B Impact Ratings System that is 
appropriate for companies and funds in developed markets; the other for the version that is 
appropriate for companies and funds in emerging markets.”). 
 178. Version 5 of the B Impact Assessment coming January 2016, THE BLOG – 
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/version-5-of-the-b-impact-assessment-coming-january-
2016.  
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entity’s use of arbitration and class action waivers.  Before the next 
version is rolled out, the Standards Advisory Council, whose members’ 
information is publicly available online, should be lobbied and 
presented with evidence regarding the dangerous proliferation of 
arbitration and post-Concepcion class action waivers.  Employees and 
consumers alike should be mobilized to participate heavily when public 
comments are opened as well.
179
 
Alternatively, B Lab could also work closely with institutions like 
the CFPB, which are already active in addressing forced arbitration and 
class action waivers, to create an addendum to the BIA dealing with 
those essential issues.
180
 For instance, in 2014, B Lab created an 
addendum to the assessment dealing with new higher education 
standards.
181
 The addendum included “targeted questions to measure 
for-profit postsecondary providers’ unique impact—for instance, who 
they serve, how they serve them, and what positive outcomes are 
produced.
182
 This addition was developed closely with numerous 
higher education institutions that are familiar with the industry.
183
 
Whether by way of an addendum to the assessment or a new 
version entirely, including questions for companies seeking 
certification that force them to disclose, in a detailed manner, their use 
of arbitration and waiver clauses would fit comfortably with the 
existing B Lab mission and framework.  B Lab champions a 
commitment to all stakeholders, not merely business shareholders
184—
workers and consumers being subjected to an unfair flavor of “justice” 
are unquestionably fundamental stakeholders, regardless of how one 
may define that loaded term.  The B Corp Declaration of 
Interdependence also states that the organization believes that “all 
business ought to be conducted as if people . . . mattered” and that 
“through their products, practices, and profits, businesses should aspire 
to do no harm and benefit all.”185  Preventing unfair, one-sided 
arbitration and plaintiffs from benefitting from class action procedures 
would go a long way towards benefitting the average person trying to 
vindicate his or her rights. 
 
 179. See supra text accompanying note 115 (this would provide an excellent opportunity 
and arena to present the CFPB’s most recent report). 
 180. See supra text accompanying note 115.  
 181. Call for Public Comment: New Higher Education Standards, THE BLOG – 
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/call-public-comment-new-higher-education-standards.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. The B Corp Declaration, CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS, 
https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-b-corp-declaration.  
 185. Id.  
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Moreover, the BIA already has an entire section devoted to 
analyzing a company’s commitment to the betterment of its workers, 
and including the pertinent topics discussed here would fit very 
naturally within that part of the assessment.
186
  Aside from asking about 
the nature and presence of waivers and arbitration clauses in a 
company’s contracts, questions could also probe into how a company 
educates its employees about their available contractual legal remedies 
prior to official employment.  Expanding the scope of the BIA in this 
manner allows B Lab to better and more completely gauge a 
company’s negative social impact, and in turn, would also make B Lab 
a far better “third party standard” for the benefit corporation. 
2. Within the California Statutory Benefit Corporation 
Framework 
The existing California benefit corporation statute also presents an 
enticing opportunity for holding businesses incorporated as such 
accountable for failing to offer their workers and customers fair access 
to the court system.  One way to do this is through the interpretation of 
statutory definitions.  The definition of a general public benefit focuses 
on an entity’s “material positive impact on society” which can very 
easily be interpreted to include social justice issues like employees’ 
access to the court system.
187
  This general public benefit is still 
“assessed against a third-party standard,” meaning that organizations 
like B Lab would still have enormous influence in deciding whether a 
company has followed its general public benefit—making the 
discussion in the preceding section all the more relevant.
188
  Of course, 
as far as a corporation’s optional “specific public benefit” is concerned, 
whether or not this encompasses the use of forced arbitration or not is 
wholly dependent on what that specific public benefit is.
189
  For 
instance, a benefit corporation can easily choose to list “fair employee 
access to courts,” or “giving consumers and employees the option to 
forgo arbitration” as one of its specific benefits. 
Another provision of the California benefit corporation statute 
bearing heavily on a business’s use of unfair contracts to limit 
plaintiffs’ access to courts is Section 14620, governing the duties of an 
 
 186. Preview the Assessment, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, http://b-
lab.force.com/bcorp/impactassessmentdemo?id=a03C000000ISIohIAH.  
 187. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(c).  
 188. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(c).  
 189. Cal. Corp. Code § 14610(b) (stating that a corporation “may identify one or more 
specific public benefits that shall be the purpose or purposes of the benefit corporation”) 
(emphasis added). 
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entity’s directors.190  This section mandates that in discharging their 
duties, those in charge must consider the impact of any action on the 
workforce and the “interests of customers of the benefit corporation as 
beneficiaries of the general or specific public benefit purposes of the 
benefit corporation.”191  These individuals must also take into account 
impacts on broader community and societal considerations.
192
  
Together, these considerations suggest that those empowered to make 
substantive decisions regarding contracts within a benefit corporation 
must also take into account the impact on employees’ and consumers’ 
access to the courts—unfairly constructed contracts disadvantaging 
these groups or preventing them from access to certain judicial 
remedies would seem to directly clash with these obligations. 
Section 14630, governing the compulsory distribution of annual 
benefit reports to a benefit corporation’s shareholders, also has the 
potential to be able to hold these corporations accountable for how they 
decide to draw up their contracts.
193
  Since entities must already 
describe “[t]he ways in which the benefit corporation pursued a general 
public benefit during the applicable year and the extent to which that 
general public benefit was created,”194 the corporation should also have 
to disclose the ways in which its contracts are drawn.  The section also 
states that, in accordance with the third-party standard, the report 
should also include “[a]n assessment of the overall social and 
environmental performance of the benefit corporation,” 195 which is yet 
another opportunity for the corporation to disclose information about 
its contracts.
 
 
Considering these opportunities for reflection on a company’s 
impact on court access, the problem of enforcement remains.  Even if a 
shareholder agrees that fair contract construction, without clauses 
waiving class litigation or forcing arbitration on unwilling parties, 
should be considered as a part of a benefit corporation’s societal 
impact—so what?  A benefit corporation, given the benefits individual 
arbitration provides to them, would still simply choose to omit these 
considerations while still reaping the positive branding effect of being 
labeled a benefit corporation.  This is where the “benefit enforcement 
proceeding” has the potential to exert power that has been, up until 
now, dormant.
196
 
 
 190. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b).  
 191. Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(2–3).  
 192. Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(4).  
 193. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14630(b).  
 194. Cal. Corp. Code § 14630(a)(1)(B).  
 195. Cal. Corp. Code § 14630(a)(2).  
 196. See supra Part IV(A)(3). 
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These proceedings can be brought if a benefit corporation fails to 
pursue its general, or specific, public benefits.
197
  It may also be 
brought if a director violates a duty imposed on him or her by the 
benefit corporation statute.
198
  Given this, its seems plausible that such 
a proceeding could be initiated against a benefit corporation for failing 
to consider the impact of unfair, one-sided contracts, due to their 
harmful contributions to society
199—especially taking into account the 
fact that Section 14620 obligates directors to consider the impact of 
their actions on employees and customers.
200
  For example, consider a 
shareholder of a benefit corporation that uses contracts of adhesion 
with compelled arbitration, who is devoted to resolving the plight of 
employees that are so subjected.  She could initiate a benefit 
enforcement proceeding against the corporation itself for acting 
contrary to the general public benefit, or against a director who signed 
off on the final form of these contracts.  If victorious, a judge could 
perhaps issue an injunction on that entity’s use of those contracts. 
Of course, there are several limitations on the ability to bring these 
proceedings, and the impact even a successful outcome might have 
remains questionable.  For one, benefit enforcement proceedings can 
only be commenced by those within the benefit corporation, e.g., 
shareholders, directors, and others authorized to do so by the entity’s 
articles of incorporation.
201
  Also, the corporation is not liable for any 
monetary damages, making it difficult to punish a corporation where it 
truly hurts: their pockets.
202
  Even if a plaintiff is successful in getting 
his or her case for benefit enforcement heard before a judge, there is a 
good chance discussion of the “business judgment rule” will dominate 
hearings.
203
  Since any proceeding will likely be an issue of first 
impression, judges will also have to wrestle with determining burdens 
 
 197. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(1).  
 198. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(2).  
 199. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(c) (describing that a benefit corporation must pursue a 
general public benefit defined as “material positive impact on society and the environment, 
taken as a whole, as assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation”).  
 200. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(2–3).  
 201. Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(b).  
 202. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(c).  
 203. Nass, supra note 158, at 891-92; see also Cal. Corp. Code § 309  (describing 
principles of the business judgment rule: “(a) A director shall perform the duties of a 
director, including duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which the 
director may serve, in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such care, including reasonable 
inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances . . . (c) A person who performs the duties of a director in accordance with 
subdivision (a) and (b) shall have no liability based upon any alleged failure to discharge the 
person’s obligations as a director”). 
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of proof and resolving questions of just what kind of evidence would 
be sufficient to prove that benefit corporation has strayed from its 
commitments.  And, of course, Concepcion’s pro-arbitration mandate 
would still cast an especially large shadow on any decision a court 
would make. 
Issues notwithstanding, benefit enforcement proceedings still 
represent the only potentially viable, statutorily sanctioned means for 
enforcing a benefit corporation’s obligations—and the only way to get 
one small but growing segment of the business community to be 
accountable for the way in which its agreements are crafted.  While we 
may have ideas about how a proceeding might go, we cannot know for 
sure without any established precedent. 
Obviously, the best scenario would be for benefit corporations and 
B Corps to recognize for themselves the precarious legal situation they 
have placed workers and consumers through the use of arbitration and 
class action waivers.  As discussed above, committing themselves to 
fairer contract standards would mesh nicely with existing benefit 
corporation missions and obligations.  Doing so may also have 
beneficial consequences for the corporation as a whole.  For one, 
investors today are already seeking the kind of open and transparent 
qualities that make a modern corporation a force for good—taking a 
leadership position on a social justice issue receiving increased 
publicity and attention like forced arbitration could serve to re-energize 
investors.
204
 
In the case a benefit corporation or B Corp has chosen to commit 
itself to allowing consumers of its products and its workers fair and 
equitable access to the court system, several substantive steps can be 
taken towards accomplishing this.  The cleanest way would be to draft 
clauses allowing claimants a choice between arbitration and litigation.  
Alternatively, unnecessary legal jargon could be avoided, and sections 
of contracts pertaining to claims resolution could be removed and 
included in an entirely separate document, requiring a separate 
 
 204. See Why do Investors Like Benefit Corporations?, BENEFIT CORPORATION 
http://benefitcorp.net/investors/who-investing-benefit-corps (Jan 13, 2016) (quoting 
Investment Rules 2.0: nonfinancial and ESG reporting trends, ERNST & YOUNG, 
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Specialty-Services/Climate-Change-and-Sustainability-
Services/EY-tomorrows-investment-rules-2) (“64% of investors say businesses do not 
adequately disclose non-financial risks and nearly half of investors would rule out 
investment based on certain non-financial disclosures”); Investment Rules 2.0: nonfinancial 
and ESG reporting trends, ERNST & YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Specialty-
Services/Climate-Change-and-Sustainability-Services/EY-tomorrows-investment-rules-2  
(“Nearly two-thirds of respondents indicat[ed] that issuers are not adequately disclosing 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks.”).  
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signature.
205
  This would serve to bring more attention to those relevant 
provisions mandating arbitration or waiving class actions.  Parties 
bringing claims could also be given the freedom to elect the arbitration 
agency, and costs incurred as a result of electing arbitration could be 
paid by the defending corporation.  Furthermore, agreements could 
“provide for a neutral arbitrator, allow discovery, and provide for a 
written decision by the arbitrator to allow judicial review.”206  Short 
educational programs could also be instituted by businesses informing 
“employees on their legal rights and how these can be enforced through 
the arbitration process.”207 
C. A Drop in the Bucket, or Something More? 
Even if benefit corporation standards and B Corp certification 
could be altered in a way to incorporate a commitment to more 
equitable contracts allowing for fairer access to courts, would this 
make a real difference?  In the short run, it would probably not lead to 
any substantive changes in the way the vast majority of businesses 
draft their contracts; businesses are unlikely to give up their 
competitive advantage in the private claim resolution system simply 
due to the moral imperatives of a relatively small sliver of companies.  
However, in the long run and due to their growing relevance, public 
benefit corporations do have the potential to facilitate a more 
substantive pivot by the business community at large toward tackling 
issues with compelled arbitration. 
Larger, more globalized benefit corporations and B Corps are 
slowly beginning to emerge in the media and public eye.  The likes of 
Patagonia,
208
 Ben & Jerry’s,209 Seventh Generation,210 New Belgium 
 
 205. See Lorene Park, Be loud, clear, and fair in arbitration provisions or be prepared 
to litigate, WOLTERS KLUWER (Aug. 7, 2012), 
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2012/08/07/be-loud-clear-and-fair-in-
arbitration-provisions-or-be-prepared-to-litigate/ (“Require signatures, including on the page 
with the arbitration provision.  It is better to have an employee sign to agree to arbitration 
rather than using an opt-out agreement where the employee is deemed to agree unless he or 
she takes action to opt out.”). 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id.  
 208. Timm Herdt, Patagonia first in line to register as a ‘benefit corporation’, 
VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Jan. 3 2012), 
http://archive.vcstar.com/business/patagonia-first-in-line-to-register-as-a-benefit-
corporation-ep-364053739-352192261.html.  
 209. Ben & Jerry’s Joins the B Corp Movement! BEN & JERRY’S, 
http://www.benjerry.com/about-us/b-corp.  
 210. Seventh Generation Receives B Corp Recertification! SEVENTH GENERATION (Jan 
13, 2015), 
http://www.seventhgeneration.com/learn/blog/seventh-generation-receives-b-corp-
recertification.  
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Brewing Co. Inc.,
211
 Method Products,
212
 Warby Parker,
213
 and Plum 
Organics
214
 are already well-known benefit corporations and B Corps.  
In the multinational corporation arena, consumer goods giant Unilever 
is working with B Lab to pave the way for its own path to becoming 
the world’s largest publicly traded B Corp.215  Unilever itself was 
perhaps inspired by Brazil’s foremost cosmetics, fragrance, and 
toiletries maker, Natura, which became “the largest—and first publicly 
traded—company to attain B Corp sustainability certification” in 
2014.
216
  Etsy, another well-known B Corp specializing in handicrafts 
e-commerce, became the second B Corp to successfully IPO in April 
2015, with shares sky rocketing 88% after it became publicly listed.
217
 
All of these companies show that not only are B Corps and benefit 
corporations here to stay, but that their structures are viable, financially 
strong, and growing in relevance.  If these companies adopted 
provisions in their articles of incorporation committing them to giving 
their workers fair access to the public court system and aggregative 
litigation, or interpreted their general and/or specific benefits to do so, 
this would create real and very impactful waves.  
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a great and growing need for incorporating access to 
justice into conventional understandings of social responsibility and the 
public benefit.  As of now, these perceptions completely fail to address 
the detrimental effect arbitration, driven by judicial interpretation, is 
having on a plaintiff’s prospects for successful litigation against 
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powerful and vested business interests.  But if companies like those 
mentioned above can prove that the average consumer cares about how 
the business he or she buys a product from, treats its workers with 
regards to claim resolution, the conventional corporation will also 
slowly integrate these principles into how it runs its business.  This has 
already been exemplified with regards to many issues that socially 
conscious companies have championed that have found their way into 
mainstream business practices—issues once never thought to emerge as 
vital in a cut-throat, competitive, and capitalist society concentrated on 
profit generation at all costs. It is now time for businesses to finally 
take steps to prioritize access to courts as a social cause they can be 
proud in championing. 
 
